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Abstract
International institutions are increasingly engaged in the exercise of public power – 
traditionally exercised by states – that might adversely affect individuals. Consequently, calls 
have arisen for checks and balances in order to provide affected individuals with adequate 
avenues for recourse and redress. Developing the ‘rule of law’ concept at the international 
level is one way in which this issue has been addressed, although only to a limited extent. 
This article explores the potential of comparative law methodology as a means to further 
this conceptualisation. It is argued that ‘vertical, bottom-up’ comparative law methods (as 
expounded by this article) can assist lawyers inspired by certain concepts within national legal 
systems (such as the rule of law) to apply these concepts – or the ideas behind them – at the 
international level. Furthermore, it is argued that employing comparative law methodology 
in this manner is increasingly justifi ed by the emergence of a ‘common zone of impact’ – i.e., 
the area of overlap between national and international law, where individuals are adversely 
affected by the exercise of public power by states and international institutions alike. The 
authors propose a comparative law typology and discuss what risks might typically be 
involved in employing comparative law methods in general, as well as ways in which these 
risks could potentially be mitigated. Specifi cally, the article sets out a particular vertical, 
bottom-up comparative law method, as employed in the context of two separate doctoral 
research projects, both focusing on ways to enhance the accountability of international 
institutions: one in the context of international territorial administrations, and the other in the 
context of the World Bank and its Inspection Panel.
1 Conceptualising the International Rule of Law: The Potential of 
Vertical Comparative Law Methods
… the history of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from other legal 
systems and of assimilation of materials from outside the law.1 
Calls for enhancing the accountability of international institutions – defi ned here 
as the need to ‘account’ for the exercise of ‘public power’2 and incorporating the 
* Both authors are currently Ph.D. candidates in public international law at the Erasmus School of 
Law, Rotterdam. The authors wish to thank Prof. Erika de Wet for her inspiring comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1 Roscoe Pound, quoted in J. B. Wiener, ‘Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants 
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law’ (2001) 27 Ecology Law Quarterly at 1295-1296, and n. 1.
2 This defi nition largely corresponds to the International Law Association’s (ILA) of ‘accountability’, 
which links accountability of international institutions to their ‘authority and power’, making 
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dual requirement to provide affected individuals with adequate avenues for recourse 
and redress3 – have become a steady chorus over the past few decades. These 
demands for accountability fl ow from a situation in which international institutions 
are increasingly engaged in exercising ‘public power’,4 traditionally exercised only 
by states, thereby steadily gaining in power and infl uence. Public international law, 
however, has failed to keep up with this changing reality to a signifi cant degree.5 
Of specifi c interest for this article, is the (oft-recurring) situation in which the 
exercise of public power by international institutions, such as the United Nations or 
the World Bank, adversely affects individuals and their environment. This scenario 
often coincides with the weakening position of the state as traditional intermediary.6 
Indeed, it is suggested that international institutions are progressively exercising 
public power alongside states, which often results in blurred lines of responsibility 
and creates a so-called ‘common zone of impact’. Under this scenario, the social 
functions fulfi lled by law in the organisation of society, such as the protection of 
the individual and the distribution of resources, are becoming increasingly similar 
in both national and international legal orders.7 Seen from a different perspective, 
the common zone of impact describes as a situation in which individuals – at the 
local level – have trouble discerning whether the adverse effects they are suffering 
result from the exercise of public power by states, international institutions, or both 
– making it almost impossible to determine who is to be held accountable (see Figure 
1 below).
 This article suggests, as others have done,8 that it might be benefi cial to look 
to national legal systems for potential ways to enhance the accountability of 
international institutions. It specifi cally argues that, in this context, comparative law 
analysis of national systems is justifi ed by the emergence of a ‘common zone of 
impact’. As the addressees of both legal domains continue to merge, the expectations 
of international law will also continue to rise. A strict separation between the two 
legal orders (including a separation of their respective comparative methodologies) 
will therefore increasingly be unwarranted.9
‘accountability’ the ‘duty to account for’ the exercise of this power. See ILA, Accountability of 
International Organisations (2004) at 5.
3 See e.g. K. Wellens, Remedies against international organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2002).
4 For the purposes of this article, ‘public power’ is defi ned as power that ‘constructs the public plane 
or space’. See P. Allot, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press 1990) at 336-
337.
5 This is refl ected, for example, in the fact that non-state actors do not have standing before most 
international (quasi-)judicial tribunals and that international institutions cannot become signatories to 
most international human rights and environmental treaties.
6 See e.g. M.N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) at 232-233.
7 See in general P. Allot, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 31.
8 See e.g. the Global Administrative Law Project of the Institute for International Law and Justice, 
New York University School of Law, with a project overview in B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R.B. 
Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68:3-4 Law & Contemporary Problems 
15. Wiener remarks that international lawyers ‘cannot examine “the same branch of the law in other 
legal systems” under different conditions, because we only have one international law on this planet – 
only one Earth. We have no database for a cross-sectional empiricism of international law. To follow 
Watson’s teaching [on comparison and similarities], we would somehow need to look at other planets 
also facing [similar problems] and evaluate how their legal systems responded in comparison to our 
own.’ See Wiener, above n. 1, at 1356.
9 This approach is decidedly non-positivistic and is based on the opinion that much of international 
law is constructed through the interaction of various actors and procedures within the international legal 
system. See in general J. Brunnée and S.J. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of 
an Interactional Theory of International Law’ (2000/2001) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
19; and see R. Higgins, ‘Refl ections from the International Court’ in M.D. Evans (ed.), International 
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 Figure 1: The ‘Common Zone of Impact’
A prominent mechanism for ensuring accountability (of state organs exercising public 
power) at the national level is, for instance, the ‘rule of law’.10 The exact meaning 
of this legal concept at the national level is often contested,11 and the meaning of 
the concept at the international level (the ‘international rule of law’) is even more 
debatable.12 For the purposes of this discussion, the ‘international rule of law’ is 
roughly conceived as consisting of similar ‘components’ as outlined by (then) UN 
Secretary General Kofi  Annan in 2004, namely:
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) 3 at 6: ‘There are not clear answers. There is a process 
by which optimal answers can be arrived at, with leading guidance given by those decision-makers 
entrusted by the international community with that task. This is the contemporary challenge in 
international law…’.
10 Another potential manner through which public power is curbed in the state context is through 
mechanisms associated with democracy. These mechanisms are primarily political in nature and 
involve notions such as popular consent based on free and fair elections, referenda and the procedure 
of popular initiative. Clearly, international law is not ‘democratic’ in this sense, nor, arguably, should it 
be.
11 See e.g. B.Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004).
12 The meaning and potential of the rule of law concept at the international level has been analysed 
in various contexts and with varying success. See e.g. D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Rule of (Administrative) 
Law in International Law’ (2005) Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2005/1, 
available at: <http://www.iilj.org> (last accessed 1 May 2009); E. Cannizzaro, ‘Machiavelli, the UN 
Security Council and the Rule of Law’ (2005) Global Law Working Paper 11/05, available at: <http://
www.law.nyu.edu/global/index.htm> (last accessed 1 May 2009). See also e.g. UN General Assembly 
Report of the Sixth Committee, The rule of law at the national and international levels, UN Doc. 
A/61/456, 17 November 2006, as well as the related report of the UN Secretary-General, Uniting our 
strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law, UN Doc. A/61/636 – S/2006/980, 
14 December 2006. Finally, see also the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, High 
Level Expert Panel Report on The Rule of Law in an Internationalised World: Looking for the Right 
Questions, as well as the Final Report and Recommendations from the 2004-2008 Austrian Initiative, 
‘The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law: The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a 
Rules-Based International System’, Ministry for European and International Affairs of the Republic of 
Austria, prepared by Prof. Simon Chesterman, available at: <http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/
panel_2_report.pdf> (last accessed 1 May 2009). Any substantive conclusions as to how the rule of law 
might be perceived at the international level fall outside the scope of this article’s focus on methodology. 
For example, see S. Chesterman. ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) Public Law and Legal Theory 
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a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.13
This article proposes that ‘vertical’ comparative law methodology14 holds signifi cant 
potential for further conceptualising the ‘international rule of law’. This assertion is 
based on the authors’ experience with two doctoral research projects, both aimed at 
analysing how the accountability of international institutions might be improved. One 
project deals with the accountability of international entities administering territories 
– international territorial administration (ITA)15 – and the other project relates to the 
World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP), an internal accountability mechanism of the 
Bank.16 Both research projects illustrate the manner in which individuals at the local 
level might be adversely affected by the international institutions’ exercise of public 
power, and both projects look to national (constitutional) law for potential solutions 
to the accountability problem.
 Section 2 of the article presents a few considerations that need to be kept in mind 
when designing and implementing vertical comparative law methods.17 Section 3 
briefl y outlines the ‘four-stage’ vertical comparative law method developed and 
applied in the context of the ITA and WBIP research projects and illustrates the 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-11, at 1. Here, Chesterman shares a similar view on the 
benefi ts of employing vertical comparison in this context. However, Chesterman does aim to provide a 
substantive outcome from the application of such a comparative method. He proposes ‘a core defi nition 
of the rule of law as a political ideal being seen as a means rather than an end, as serving a function 
rather than defi ning a status’.
13 See the report of the UN Secretary-General, Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations 
support for the rule of law, UN Doc. A/61/636 – S/2006/980, 14 December 2006. Note that UN 
Secretary-General Kofi  Annan was referring here to the ‘rule of law’ in a state context. However, this 
article argues, notions such as the ‘rule of law’ can be successfully transposed to the international level. 
See also UN General Assembly Report of the Sixth Committee, The rule of law at the national and 
international levels, UN Doc. A/61/456, 17 November 2006 and UN Doc. A/61/636 – S/2006/980, 14 
December 2006.
14 For a defi nition of vertical comparative law methodology, see section 2.1 below.
15 International territorial administration (ITA) as a concept denotes situations in which an 
international entity has assumed the authority to exercise public power within a territory. This authority 
affects individuals directly, is virtually all-encompassing, ultimate in nature and includes legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers. To all intents and purposes, international institutions in casu substitute 
the state and, moreover, act as one. This dynamic concept has been applied in several instances on 
an ad hoc basis, arguably lacking an adequate conceptual framework and institutional backing. The 
concept and its application have outgrown the confi nes, institutional capacity and terminology of public 
international law, which has become ineffective in tackling crucial issues inherent in ITA. The research 
project explores how essential principles of public international law – traditionally related to states – 
could contribute to solving the lack of accountability and ultimately increase the legitimacy of such 
undertakings. Findings resulting from this research project are envisaged for publication in 2010.
16 The World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) was established in 1994 to improve the accountability 
and legitimacy of the World Bank (i.e. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA)).The WBIP investigates and reviews 
the extent to which the World Bank has complied with its own operational policies and procedures in 
the course of the design, appraisal and implementation of World Bank fi nanced development projects. 
Such an investigation is triggered by a complaint brought by two or more individuals that claim to 
have been adversely affected by the organisation’s non-compliance with its internal standards. See 
Resolution No. IBRD 93-10; Resolution No. IDA 93-6 ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel’, at para. 12 
(hereinafter, the ‘Inspection Panel Resolution’). On completion of its investigations, the WBIP makes 
a recommendation to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors – the fi nal decision-making authority 
in the process (Inspection Panel Resolution, paras. 19, 23). See in general A. Naudé Fourie, The World 
Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight: In Search of the ‘Judicial Spirit’ in Public 
International Law (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing 2009, forthcoming).
17 By ‘method’, we mean ‘the “techniques” by which comparisons are carried out’. See V.V. Palmer, 
‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 53 American 
Journal of Comparative Law at 262-263.
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method with examples from the two projects. Section 4 concludes with several brief 
comments on the major insights drawn from the vertical comparative law method 
and the potential of such methods for conceptualising the international rule of law.
2 Considerations for Employing Comparative Law Methods
The considerations discussed in this section have been formulated based on our 
experience with a specifi c form of comparison (‘vertical’ – as will be explained 
below), but it is suggested that they might be of broader value to legal comparativists 
in general. The fi rst consideration is typological in nature (2.1) and the second 
concerns a few general risks involved in employing comparative law methodology 
(2.2).
2.1 Four Modes of Comparison: A Suggested Typology
At the outset, it might be useful to clarify which ‘mode’ or form of legal comparison 
is being used, since different modes might require different risk considerations (see 
section 2.2 below) and different comparative methods altogether.18 We propose that 
legal comparison is primarily ‘horizontal’ (occurring among legal systems belonging 
to the same ‘level’ or ‘echelon’) or ‘vertical’ (occurring among legal systems not 
belonging to the same ‘level’, i.e. ‘cross-echelon’). Within this primary typology, 
we foresee four potential (secondary) modes of legal comparison (see Figure 2 
below): (1) horizontal, among legal systems at the national level (e.g. comparative 
constitutional law and confl ict of law studies)19 and (2) horizontal, among legal 
systems or regimes at the international level (e.g. when international institutions or 
compliance mechanisms are compared or when a treaty in one area of international 
law is compared to a (proposed) treaty in a different area of international law).20 
 Legal comparison might also be (3) vertical, ‘top-down’ (e.g. typically in the context 
of the internalisation of international norms and regulations by national legal orders, 
whereby national law is required to incorporate international concepts into the 
national legal system, terminology and ideology),21 or (4) vertical, ‘bottom-up’. This 
fourth mode of legal comparison refl ects the method discussed in this article, and 
will therefore be expounded in more detail.
18 See e.g. Wiener, above n. 1, at 1297: ‘… the debate among comparativists over the propriety of 
transnational borrowing has only limited guidance to offer to those interested in the very different 
question of trans-echelon borrowing, because the merits of horizontal and vertical borrowing depend 
on rather different considerations’.
19 See in general T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003).
20 A.C. Kiss, ‘Comparative Law and Public International Law’ in W.E. Butler (ed.), International Law 
in Comparative Perspective (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980).
21 See e.g. D. Rosenblum, ‘Internalizing Gender: Why International Law Theory Should Adopt 
Comparative Method’ (2007) 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 759. See also H.E. Chodosh, 
‘Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology’ (1999) 84 Iowa Law Review 1025 at 1038: 
‘[E] ach view of the increasingly penetrating role of an international law, institution, or a process in a 
traditionally national ambit of authority relies on a comparison.’
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Fi gure 2: Four ‘Modes’ of Legal Comparison
Vertical, ‘bottom-up’ legal comparison, as defi ned here, refers to the transposition of 
legal concepts, or the ideas behind them, from national to international level. This 
mode of legal comparison has conventionally been viewed with scepticism due to 
the assumption of inherent incompatibility between the national and international 
legal orders.22 Gutteridge, for example, refl ects this conventional position, arguing 
that
so far as it exists at all, any relationship or kinship between comparative law and the law of nations 
must, therefore, be of a shadowy nature, and the only possible link between the two disciplines is to be 
found in the extent to which the comparative study of private law can be regarded as an instrument to 
be employed in promoting the growth and development of the law of nations.23
The pervasive scepticism regarding vertical, ‘bottom-up’ legal comparison might 
explain the lack of methodological research in this area.24 It does not signify, 
however, that international lawyers have not been employing vertical, ‘bottom-up’ 
comparative legal methods to a signifi cant degree and for a signifi cant amount of 
time;25 they have just not been as forthright about it.26 As Wiener remarks:
… even a brief inquiry reveals that there are many examples of vertical legal borrowing between national 
and international law in practice; what is needed is a more rigorous analytical approach to how, why, 
and when these trans-echelon transplantations occur, and when we should choose to undertake them.27
22 Note that there have been similar sceptical reactions to the functionalist method and other 
similarities-oriented comparative methods that dominated the 20th century. See G. Dannemann, 
‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?’ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmerman (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) at 390 for an 
overview of ‘difference theorists’ that work with a presumption of dissimilarity.
23 Quoted in Butler, above n. 20, at 27.
24 See e.g. Wiener, above n. 1, at 1297.
25 Principles entrenched in the international legal order such as good faith, pacta sunt servanda and 
res judicata all fi nd their origin at the national level. See M. Bothe and G. Ress, ‘The Comparative 
Method and Public International Law’ in Butler, above n. 20, at 51, 58-62. See also Kiss, in Butler, 
above n. 20, at 44.
26 Wiener, above n. 1, at 1301: ‘Whatever couplings or comminglings between national and 
international law have in fact occurred might have been so discreet, or perhaps so scandalous, that no 
one seems to talk about them in polite company (at least not for very long). Even if borrowing from 
national into international law occurs in practice, it seems to have been neglected or hushed, both in 
offi cialdom and in theory.’
27 Wiener, above n. 1, at 1297.
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This article submits that, while scepticism regarding vertical comparative methods 
might be healthy – especially when aimed at identifying and mitigating the risks 
involved in using comparative law methods, as discussed below – the employment 
of vertical, ‘bottom-up’ comparative law methods is increasingly justifi ed by the 
emerging ‘common zone of impact’.28
2.2 Risks Involved in Employing Comparative Law Methods
This section outlines three risks or pitfalls associated with the employment of 
comparative law methods, namely failure to take context into account (2.2.1), 
engaging in one-dimensional comparative analysis (2.2.2) and skewing comparative 
analysis to fi t preconceived ideas (2.2.3).29 Before considering each of these 
pitfalls, a general remark is in order. It is often asked whether the risks involved 
in comparative law methods are different depending on the particular mode of 
comparison. For instance, is vertical comparison inherently riskier than horizontal 
modes of comparison? Since this article is based on two specifi c experiences with 
the vertical comparative mode (although the method outlined in Section 3 does 
include elements of horizontal comparison),30 we do not venture a defi nitive answer. 
Tentatively speaking, therefore, it appears that the risks outlined in this section are 
probably similar for all four modes of legal comparison, although there may be 
differences in degree.
1.2.1 Failure to Consider Context Properly
Failure to account for contextual differences is perhaps the most common post-
modernist criticism of comparative law methodology.31 Clearly, a thorough 
understanding of all the legal systems included in the comparative analysis is a 
sine qua non that has become widely accepted by legal comparativists.32 Such an 
acknowledgement, however, is not necessarily useful for determining how to mitigate 
the risk itself. For instance, how far does one have to go in accounting for contextual 
difference? Is extensive, detailed knowledge of the legal system – similar to that 
of native lawyers originally trained in that system – necessarily required? Such a 
requirement might place comparative law methods beyond the reach of many, since 
it would require time and fi nancial commitments that many lawyers are unwilling 
or unable to make. Moreover, is complete immersion really necessary in order to 
consider context properly?
 This article argues that while failure to consider the context properly remains a 
prominent risk within comparative law methodology, being overly concerned about 
this risk may lead to ‘exaggerations and absurdities’.33 In other words, the importance 
of contextual differences should not be overstated as more extensive analysis often 
reveals that many apparent ‘differences’ are, in fact, superfi cial. Moreover, complete 
immersion into a particular legal system is hardly ever possible, since it can only 
28 See Figure 1 above.
29 Section 3 describes how these specifi c risks have been considered in the context of the method 
employed by the two doctoral research projects.
30 See section 3.3.2 below.
31 Note that post-modernist critique is critical of comparative methods in general – not only of 
comparative legal methodology. See A. Peters and H. Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law beyond Post-
Modernism’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 801-802.
32 See e.g. Koopmans, above n. 19, at 96-97.
33 See e.g. Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 803. See also Palmer, above n. 17, at 261.
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occur up to a point before constraints such as time, costs and language skills become 
more important considerations.34 Mitigating this risk therefore involves a trade-off 
between being thorough and heeding the above-mentioned constraints.
1.2.2 Conducting One-Dimensional Comparative Analysis
Another component of the post-modernist critique of comparative methodology 
is its criticism of ‘functionalism’, the predominant comparative law method.35 
 Functionalism emphasises ‘a concrete social problem’ instead of the formal aspects 
of laws or institutions and therefore analyses the social function of the legal concepts 
that are being compared.36 This article does not address the merits of several specifi c 
criticisms aimed against functionalism. However, it is suggested that the common 
denominator of these criticisms is the rejection of functionalism’s monopoly as 
the predominant method. This article shares that viewpoint, although the specifi c 
point we wish to make here pertains to the risk of conducting a one-dimensional 
comparative analysis – the risk being that the analysis is not only one-dimensional 
but also one-sided, lacking suffi cient depth.37 While we argue that functionalism 
should not be summarily rejected (in contrast to many of its critics) since it continues 
to strengthen comparative law methodology,38 we do contend that it should not be the 
sole focus of comparative law methodology. As Myres McDougal remarks:
The demand for inquiring into function is, however, but the beginning of insight. Further questions are 
‘functional’ for whom, against whom, with respect to what values, determined by what decision-makers 
under what conditions, how, with what effects.39
In other words, it is suggested that the risk can be mitigated by considering multiple 
aspects of the particular legal concept under consideration, which should typically 
include both substantive (such as the social function of the legal concept) and 
procedural elements.40
1.2.3 Skewing the Comparative Study Based on Preconceived Ideas
Two types of ‘preconceived ideas’ inject a substantial degree of subjectivity into 
the comparative law analysis, which might unconsciously skew the outcomes of the 
analysis, namely our ideas about ‘law’ and the comparative objective(s). This section 
addresses each one in turn.
34 Palmer, above n. 17, at 290.
35 See Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 827, explaining that post-modernist critique charges 
functionalism with being inherently biased and implicitly hegemonic. Others have criticised functionalism 
for being purely contemporary in nature, lacking incentives to engage in historical research. See e.g. 
O. Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’ 
(2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405 at 417-420. A further central critique addresses 
functionalism’s emphasis on similarities. This has even led some authors to propagate a ‘presumption 
of dissimilarity’ instead, which considers certain concepts and legal orders ‘irrevocably irreconcilable’. 
See e.g. Dannemann, above n. 22, at 390. See also D.J. Gerber, ‘Toward a Language of Comparative 
Law?’ (1998) 46:4 The American Journal of Comparative Law 719 at 722-724. Gerber’s main criticism 
of functionalism is that it is not aimed at analysing procedural aspects, because it is normatively focused 
on the ‘social function of norms’.
36 Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 808, quoting Ernst Rabel, founder of the functional approach.
37 For instance, Gerber notes that a comparative approach grounded in functionalism only tends to 
focus on the substantive aspects of law, while new comparative objectives also require an emphasis on 
e.g. procedural elements. See Gerber, above n. 35, at 722-726.
38 See section 3.2 below.
39 Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 828, quoting Myres S. McDougal.
40 See in general Gerber, above n. 35.
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 First, comparative law methodology is fundamentally infl uenced by our own 
perceptions of what (international) law ‘is’. It has been argued, for example, that 
a strictly positivist or strictly naturalist view of law cannot sustain any forms of 
legal comparison.41  On the one hand, having ‘preconceived’ ideas about what 
(international) law is, or how it should be, is not only inevitable but also desirable 
if normative development is to occur. At the very least, a legal comparativist’s 
jurisprudential view on ‘law’ invariably infl uences the manner in which comparative 
law methods are constructed and applied.42 On the other hand, being unaware of our 
own perceptions about ‘law’ and how it infl uences comparative law methodology 
might result in a distortion of the results.
 Second, the comparative objective is likely to be closely associated with the 
underlying comparative method, and, as many have argued, this is how it should 
be.43 As Gerber puts it, ‘where are we going?’ and ‘how can we get there?’ are 
(or at least should be) interrelated questions.44 For instance, when the goal is 
legal ‘unifi cation’ and ‘harmonisation’,45 or when comparison is fuelled primarily 
by scientifi c curiosity or the need to improve one’s understanding of law,46 the 
comparative focus might be both on the similarities and differences between legal 
systems.47 Conversely, when comparative methodology is used as a ‘tool’ to solve a 
particular problem in a legal system, the emphasis might be on the ‘common core’ of 
the legal systems being compared.48 However, there is a risk that narrowly focusing 
on the comparative objective might inject an unacceptable degree of bias. For 
example, a comparativist bent on fi nding a solution for a particular problem through 
comparative law methodology might ignore or understate the differences between 
legal systems uncovered by the comparative law analysis.
 Clearly, a comparative law study cannot do without the legal comparativist’s own 
perceptions about ‘law’ or without having clear comparative objectives, even though 
they inject a degree of subjectivity into the analysis that might skew the results in 
a certain manner. This article suggests, however, that this risk might be mitigated, 
fi rst and foremost, by being upfront about one’s own ideas about law and about the 
comparative objective and, secondly by understanding how they might infl uence 
the use of comparative law methodology. This awareness should serve as a check 
throughout the process of employing comparative law methods.
41 C. Valcke, ‘Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence – The Comparability of Legal Systems’ 
(2004) 52 The American Journal of Comparative Law 713 at 719.
42 Clarifying how a particular comparative law methodology is grounded in legal theory helps, for 
example, to determine the comparative scope. For instance, Valcke links his theory of ‘comparative 
jurisprudence’ to Ewald’s notion about ‘law as jurisprudence’, which argues that law is not ‘law in 
books’ or ‘law in action’ but ‘law in minds’ – hence, ‘a web of beliefs, ideals, choices, desires, interests, 
justifi cations, principles, techniques, reasons, and assumptions’. Accordingly, ‘comparative law as 
jurisprudence’ surmises that law can only be ‘apprehended from within, from the standpoint of legal 
actors.’ See Valcke, above n. 41, at 716-717. See also Brand, above n. 35, at 435.
43 Gerber, above n. 35, at 721.
44 Gerber, above n. 35, at 719. Gerber argues that these two questions are currently not closely aligned, 
since legal comparativists are pursuing ‘new comparative objectives’ with methods that have been 
based on the predominant comparative objective, namely, functionalism.
45 Dannemann, above n. 22, at 402-403. See also K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998, 3rd ed.) at 16-17, 24-28; and Gerber, above 
n. 35, at 721.
46 Dannemann, above n. 22, at 404-405.
47 Id. See also Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 15: ‘the primary aim of comparative law, as of 
all sciences, is knowledge’, and at 21-24 on the educational function of comparative law. See also 
Koopmans, above n. 19, at 5-6 on various comparative objectives; and G. Haraszti, ‘The Comparative 
Method in Comparative Law’ in Butler, above n. 20, at 117 on how comparative law can shed light on 
‘the genesis of particular institutes’. See also Dannemann, above n. 22, at 401, arguing that there is not 
an exhaustive list of comparative goals.
48 See Gerber, above n. 35, at 721.
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3 The ITA/WBIP Vertical Comparative Law Method
This article submits that, while there might be similar or even recurring steps in 
various comparative law methods, ‘comparative law is not one, it is many’.49 The 
choice of a particular comparative method is ‘a function of variables’ such as ‘the 
purposes of the project and the individual circumstances of those who pursue it’.50 
In other words, we argue that ‘… there is a sliding scale of methods and the best 
approach will always be adapted’ to the specifi c research project, taking into account 
considerations such as ‘the specifi c purposes of the research, the subjective abilities 
of the researcher, and the affordability of the costs’.51 This section will discuss a 
particular comparative law method developed in the context of the ITA and WBIP 
doctoral research projects (the ‘ITA/WBIP Vertical Comparative Law Method’ or 
‘Method’). The mode of comparison utilised by the Method is primarily vertical, 
bottom-up,52 since it involves the transposition of legal concepts from the national to 
the international level. However, the Method also incorporates elements of horizontal 
legal comparison,53 as this section illustrates.
 The ITA/WBIP Vertical Comparative Law Method consists of four stages that are 
set out in a linear fashion in this section, although, in practice, the Method will likely 
require some iteration.54 Stage one involves the formulation of a hypothesis based on 
the observation of prima facie similarities between legal systems (3.1). In stage two, 
a conceptual model is constructed that serves as the basis for comparison between 
national and international legal systems (3.2). Stage three involves a systematic 
(vertical) comparison between national and international legal systems (3.3). Finally, 
the results from this vertical comparison are synthesised in stage four, providing a 
basis for drawing conclusions (3.4).
3.1 Stage One: Formulating a Hypothesis
While hypothesis formulation is the point of departure for scientifi c research 
in general, hypotheses formulated in the context of legal research employing 
comparative law methodology are often triggered by the observance of apparent 
similarities between legal systems – whether those similarities concern a particular 
problem, the solution to the problem, or both. Stage one of the Method is based 
on a praesumptio similitudinis,55 derived from the actual observation of similarities 
between problems and (potential) solutions at the common zone of impact.56 The 
ITA and WBIP projects observe that individuals and their environment are adversely 
affected due to the exercise of power by international administrating entities and the 
World Bank in ways similar to individuals adversely affected by states exercising 
public power. Both projects are based on the assumption that there is a signifi cant 
49 See Valcke, above n. 41, at 715; and Palmer, above n. 17, at 262-263 and 285. On the development of 
comparative law methodology and the employment thereof, see in general W.J. Kamba, ‘Comparative 
Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 3 at 485.
50 Palmer, above n. 17, at 290.
51 Id.
52 On the four different modes of comparative research, see section 2 above.
53 Id.
54 See Brand, above n. 35, at 439.
55 See e.g. Dannemann, above n. 22, at 388. In this respect, the Method is infl uenced by functionalism, 
which is rooted in the presumption that ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same 
problems, and solves these problems by quite different means though very often with similar results’. 
See Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 34.
56 Whether one emphasises differences or similarities remains a balancing act and depends on the 
purpose of comparison. See Dannemann, above n. 22, at 383-385.
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similarity in the manner in which the accountability of these international institutions 
could be enhanced, namely through a system of checks and balances – ranging from 
an institutionalised rule of law concept to the reviewability of decisions – that is 
usually found in the context of national constitutional systems
 In the context of the ITA project, it is observed that international administrating 
entities experience problems setting up meaningful accountability structures.57 The 
research project hypothesises that, in order to overcome obstacles in setting up such 
structures, international territorial administrations should be perceived as state-like 
entities rather than international institutions engaged in extensive peacebuilding 
operations.58 Only such a paradigm shift can facilitate potential solutions to the 
problems of accountability and legitimacy. Hence, the ITA project’s hypothesis 
asserts that the institutional design and processes of ITAs should refl ect concepts 
and mechanisms that usually serve to regulate the exercise of public power in the 
state context. 
 The WBIP project observes similarities between an existing accountability 
mechanism – the Inspection Panel – and judicial entities in national legal systems 
exercising judicial review of political decisions or actions. Obvious differences 
between the Inspection Panel and courts exercising judicial review pertain to the 
limited decision-making authority of the Panel, and its institutional dependency 
on the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors.59 However, the project notes that 
prominent judicial institutions – such as the French Conseil d’Etat and the Dutch 
Raad van State – started off with a relatively low level of institutional independence, 
had a narrow review mandate and were not even initially considered to be ‘courts’ 
but only had advisory powers.60 The WBIP project consequently hypothesises that 
there is a functional, procedural and institutional equivalence between the World 
Bank Inspection Panel and mechanisms exercising judicial or constitutional review 
in national legal systems.
 Thus, the hypothesis formulated at the outcome of stage one clarifi es which 
particular aspect(s) should be the focus of the comparative law study and therefore 
require further conceptualisation in stage two. For the ITA project, the object of 
comparison is ‘the state’ and related mechanisms for regulating the exercise of public 
power; the WBIP project’s object of comparison is ‘judicial review’ in the national 
legal context.
57 International administrating entities have been widely criticised for their persistent reluctance to 
establish mechanisms and procedures that would adequately address the call for their accountability, 
primarily vis-à-vis the local populations subjected to their rule. See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Better 
Late Than Never – Enhancing the Accountability of International Institutions in Kosovo’, Briefi ng 
Paper No. 2, 14 June 2007.
58 Certain authoritative documents, as well as academic writing, have come close to describing the 
authority assumed during ITA as resembling fully-fl edged governmental power. For example, the 
UN Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping observes that UN peacekeeping operations have 
become ‘multidimensional’ as they increasingly include non-military components. The Handbook also 
makes explicit reference to ITA by stating that ‘multidimensional peacekeeping operations … may be 
required to … [a]dminister a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that 
are normally the responsibility of a government’ which creates a situation in which the international 
presence is ‘responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life while simultaneously working 
to devolve its responsibilities to local authorities’. Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping 
Best Practices Unit, December 2003, at 1, 2 and 35 (emphasis added).
59 Inspection Panel Resolution, paras. 10, 12, 14, 19 and 21.
60 For a discussion of the Conseil d’Etat, see Koopmans, above n. 19, at 10, 34-36. The Dutch 
Raad van State obtained judicial powers only around 1976. See Vlasblom, De macht der kritiek: De 
gedachtevorming over aard en zin van rechterli jke beoordeling van bestuursoptreden sedert omstreeks 
1815, available at: <http://irs.ub.rug.nl/ppn/043199305> (last accessed 1 May 2009); and see in general 
J. van der Hoeven, De drie dimensies van het bestuursrecht – ontstaan en vorming van het Nederlandse 
algemene bestuursrecht (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1989).
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3.2 Stage Two: Constructi ng a Conceptual Model
Stage two involves the development of an abstract, conceptual model of the object(s) 
of comparison that were identifi ed through the hypothesis formulation that occurred 
in stage one. This conceptual model has to capture the ‘right’ level of abstraction in 
order to fulfi l its purpose, which is to serve as a basis for the vertical comparison 
of the national and international legal systems. While constructing a conceptual 
model is in some ways similar to the ‘common core’ notion frequently employed by 
functionalists such as Schlesinger, Zweigert and Kötz,61 this stage of the Method goes 
beyond the establishment of a ‘common core’ that is exclusively derived from the 
social functions fulfi lled by the object(s) of comparison.62 Developing a conceptual 
model also requires more than formulating a broad defi nition or fi nding the ‘lowest 
common denominator’.63 Importantly, this stage should not be interpreted as the 
propagation of universally acknowledged ‘prototype’ norms or principles.64
 Instead, the conceptual model constructed during this stage is an analytical tool 
that ‘serves as a yardstick for the comparison’,65 the tertium comparationis.66 It is 
suggested that the conceptual model should uncover multiple facets or dimensions 
of the legal concept in question (i.e. the object of comparison).67 The process of 
expounding such a multi-faceted model might also benefi t from the application of 
non-legal conceptual tools and frameworks, for example from fi elds such as law and 
economics or political science.68 The WBIP project, for instance, employs systems 
thinking theory (especially the analytical tools provided by systems dynamics) in 
developing its conceptual model.69
 Stage two unfolds in two steps. First, an initial – and theoretical – conceptual 
model is developed that describes the key characteristics, principles, functions and 
dynamics of the legal concept as it operates within its traditional context (3.2.1). 
Second, the conceptual model is verifi ed and refi ned through a horizontal legal 
comparison (3.2.2), which may also include an historical analytical component.70
61 Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 808. Zweigert and Kötz also emphasise the necessity to create 
an ‘abstract heuristic conceptual framework; free from the context of a particular system’ and ‘fl exible 
enough to grasp a wide variety of ‘heterogeneous institutions which are functionally comparable’. See 
Chodosh, above n. 21, at 1051, quoting Zweigert and Kötz.
62 On functionalism, see section 2 above. Zweigert and Kötz explain the functionalist focus of the 
‘common core’ as follows: ‘… the solutions we fi nd in the different jurisdictions must be cut loose 
from their conceptual context and stripped of their national doctrinal overtones so that they may be seen 
purely in the light of their function, as an attempt to satisfy a particular legal need’. See Zweigert and 
Kötz, above n. 45, at 44. For a similar approach, see Brand, above n. 35, at 443.
63 In a similar fashion, Dutoit describes the approach taken by the European Court of Justice (dealing 
with distinct administrative law principles and elevating them to the Community level) as follows: 
‘The object is not to illuminate the smallest common denominator of the laws of the states, but on the 
contrary to seek a solution toward which the legal orders being compared are disposed and which best 
fi ts the goals of the EES.’ See B. Dutoit, ‘Comparative Law and Public International Law’ in Butler, 
above n. 20, at 80.
64 Peters and Schwenke, above n. 31, at 810.
65 Koopmans, above n. 19, at 6-9.
66 Comparative law research starts with a working hypothesis, often born out of an observed defi ciency. 
See Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 34.
67 For a discussion about the risks of conducting single-aspect comparative analysis, see section 2 
above.
68 See e.g. M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2002).
69 See e.g. J.D. Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World 
(McGraw-Hill Higher Education 2000). See also Naudé Fourie, above n. 16.
70 See above n. 35.
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1.3.1 Constructing the Initial Conceptual Model
The ITA project focuses primarily on analysing how accountability issues have 
been perceived and addressed at the national level, i.e. how concepts of limited 
government and accountability are institutionalised.71 Three mechanisms associated 
with the regulation of public power in the state context are conceptualised, namely 
the diffusion of power, the reviewability of decisions and the rule of law. The WBIP 
project, in turn, conceptualises three aspects of judicial review, namely its ‘nature’ 
(or core characteristics), its ‘effect’ (or the outcomes associated with the exercise 
of judicial review) and its ‘dynamics’. The dynamics of judicial review refer to the 
relationships between various components within a system of judicial review – such 
as courts and political institutions – and the consequences of those relationships for 
courts exercising a mandate of judicial review.
1.3.2 Verifying and Refi nin g the Conceptual Model
The initial model is verifi ed and refi ned by means of a horizontal legal comparative 
analysis. In other words, the model is tested against actual case law from national 
legal systems or against other empirical evidence. An initial step, therefore, would be 
to set up the horizontal comparative study, for example by determining the historical 
range or by deciding which legal systems – and specifi c case law from those systems 
– to include in the horizontal analysis.72
 The ITA project explores state-like entities in an historically cross-cutting fashion 
in an attempt to refi ne and further neutralise the model. In doing so, the model is 
further detached from the nation state concept and translated into terms more closely 
related to the exercise of public power as such.73 This results in a conceptual model 
that outlines the fundamental principles governing the exercise of public power 
and aims to minimise the chance of abuse. The WBIP project verifi es the ‘judicial 
review model’ through a (horizontal) comparative constitutional law analysis, by 
applying the model to case law from the constitutional canons of the United States, 
the European Union (Community law) and South Africa.74 The model is refi ned by 
utilising analytical tools from the fi eld of systems dynamics (such as causal loop 
diagrams)75 to make sense of certain observations emerging from the comparative law 
study, such as the apparent fl uctuation between judicial ‘activism’ and ‘restraint’.76
71 As pointed out previously, the construction of this model by no means implies universality. Its aim 
is to distil essential principles and workable solutions employed in situations dealing with challenges 
similar to the ones faced at the international level. Thus, for instance, if it were to be established that 
the concept of limited government is not accepted by a certain group of national legal orders, this 
would not prevent the construction of a model based on the legal orders that do embrace the concept. 
The aim of the comparison in toto is to address an expressly proclaimed need: enhanced accountability. 
Therefore, the hypothetical existence of national legal systems that do not subscribe to the concept of 
accountability of holders of public authority is in fact irrelevant.
72 Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 34; and see R. Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in 
Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2005) 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 125 at 142 on the 
selection of legal systems to include in a horizontal comparative study.
73 See e.g. A. Momirov, ‘The individual right to petition in internationalized territories: from 
progressive thought to an abandoned practice’ (2007) 9 Journal of the History of International Law 2.
74 See Hirschl, above n. 72, at 133, mentioning four principles on which cases can be selected: ‘most 
similar cases’, ‘most diffi cult cases’, ‘prototypical cases’ and ‘outlier cases’.
75 See e.g. V. Anderson, Systems Thinking: From Concepts  to Causal Loops (Waltham, MA: Pegasus 
Communications, Inc. 1997) at 20.
76 See in general K. Roosevelt (III), The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making Sense of Supreme Court 
Decisions (New Haven: Yale University Press 2006); and Koopmans, above n. 19 at 51-57.
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 In sum, the outcome of stage two is a multi-faceted conceptual model of the 
comparative legal object that has been verifi ed through a particular form of horizontal 
legal comparison and may therefore be viewed as being representative of national 
legal systems in a general sense. This conceptual model can now serve as the basis 
for further vertical comparison, as discussed in stage three.
3.3 Stage Three: Conducting Vertical Comparison
Stage three of the Method forms the heart of the vertical or cross-echelon legal 
comparative process77 and involves making ‘a statement or estimate of similarities 
and differences’.78 During this stage, the conceptual model (developed in stage 
two) is compared with the (quasi-)legal concept or a particular situation at the 
international level. In other words, the hypothesis (developed in stage one) is tested 
by analysing the similarities (3.3.1) and differences (3.3.2) between the national 
level (as represented by the conceptual model) and the international level. For 
the ITA project, this stage involves a comparison of the institutional design and 
practice of the UN administrations of Timor Leste and the territory of Kosovo, as 
well as the international governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, against the model 
of fundamental principles governing the exercise of public power and aimed at 
minimising the chance of abuse.79 For the WBIP project, stage three constitutes an 
analysis of the conceptual model (of judicial review) compared to the World Bank 
Inspection Panel’s institutional history, design and practice (i.e. requests from 
individuals for investigations into the compliance of World Bank development 
projects with the Bank’s operational policies and procedures).80
1.3.1 Analysing Similarities
The detailed vertical analysis should confi rm the existence of the prima facie 
similarities (identifi ed at the beginning of the process)81 and could reveal additional 
similarities between the conceptual model and the international (quasi-)legal 
concept. However, these similarities should not be accepted without questioning 
77 For a discussion of the different modes of comparison, see section 2 above.
78 A defi nition of ‘comparison’ as given in the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(Houghton Miffl in Company 2000, 4th ed.), available at: <http://www.bartleby.com> (last accessed 1 
May 2009).
79 Concerning the territory of Kosovo: On 10 June 1999, UNSC Res. 1244 (1999) was adopted, 
deciding on an ‘international civil and security presence’ and paving the way for the establishment of 
UNMIK, the UN mission in Kosovo. A Special Representative was appointed by the Secretary-General 
to ‘control the implementation of the international civil presence’ and to ‘coordinate closely with the 
international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a 
mutually supportive manner’. Concerning Timor Leste: On 25 October 1999, based on the situation on 
the ground and on an agreement between Indonesia and Portugal regarding the transfer of authority to 
the United Nations, UNSC Res. 1272 (1999) was adopted establishing UNTAET, which was empowered 
to assume full civil administration of the territory and contained a military component, with reference 
to the multinational force previously deployed pursuant to UNSC Res. 1264 (1999). UNTAET was 
formally terminated on 20 May 2002, upon the independence of East Timor. Concerning Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The efforts to establish and maintain sustainable stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
complex, as they are carried out by numerous actors and entities. The General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, negotiated in Dayton, Ohio and signed in Paris on 14 December 
1995 (Dayton Peace Agreement), established the Offi ce of the High Representative, entrusted with fi nal 
authority with regard to the implementation of the peace agreement.
80 Inspection Panel Resolution, para. 14.
81 See section 3.1 above.
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their signifi cance; they might, for instance, be merely coincidental.82 Moreover, not 
all similarities are likely to be of equal signifi cance. Hence, the Method suggests that 
identifi ed similarities should be further qualifi ed.83
 For the ITA project, the conceptual model developed in stage two serves as scale 
against which the ITA concept is assessed. The parallel initially drawn between 
states and ITA is explored and affi rmed. For instance, research shows that documents 
and resolutions establishing ITAs entrust these international entities with mandates 
to exercise public power virtually mirroring the scope of public power exercised 
by states.84 Furthermore, ITA practice has interpreted these mandates expansively, 
furthering the semblance between a state and ITA. 
 The vertical comparative analysis in the WBIP project reveals, for example, that 
the Inspection Panel’s independence from World Bank management is formally 
ensured by several provisions in the Panel’s constitutive resolution that resemble 
similar provisions in national constitutions.85 The analysis also reveals that the 
Inspection Panel asserts its de facto independence from World Bank management in 
manners comparable to national courts exercising judicial review. This last fi nding 
of similarity is of greater signifi cance for the research project because the Inspection 
Panel process is often criticised for not ensuring adequate independence from the 
Bank.86
1.3.2 Analysing Differences
Ultimately, the differences between the conceptual model (representative of the 
comparative object in national legal systems) and the object of comparison at the 
international level determine the boundaries of the analogy. In addition, they are 
crucial in proving or disproving the hypothesis – especially since the Method departs 
from a presumption of similarity.87 As with the similarities, however, the differences 
identifi ed by the vertical comparative analysis should not be taken at face value. For 
instance, differences may turn out to be more artifi cial once the context is taken into 
account or when differences in language or terminology are better understood.
 In the ITA project, for example, comparison shows that, while states enjoy full 
sovereignty, international entities administering territories (formally) do not. Another 
difference is observed in the fact that, unlike states, international administrations – 
being part of international organisations – enjoy extensive immunities. However, 
further research indicates that these differences are predominantly a result of 
82 See Wiener, above n. 1, at 1356. Wiener quotes Watson: ‘It is a myth to think that … every parallel 
is a provenance.’
83 Brand, above n. 35, at 445 on the notion of ‘gradation’. See also M. Cohn and M. Kremnitzer, 
‘Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model’ (2005) 18 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
at 333-356, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=942476> (last accessed 1 May 2009).
84 Thus, the parallel is founded – among others things – on these mandates, which form the basis from 
which the international entities operate within the territory they administer. These mandates entrust all-
encompassing and ultimate legislative, executive and judicial power to the entities, i.e. the public power 
traditionally vested in a state.
85 Inspection Panel Resolution, para. 4: Panel members cannot be employed by the World Bank group 
(in any capacity) after the end of their three-year term. The effect of this provision is arguably similar 
to that of national constitutions granting judges ‘life tenure’. See e.g. Article 97(2) of the German 
Constitution.
86 See e.g. S.R. Roos, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel in its Seventh Year: An Analysis of its 
Process, Mandate, and Desirability with Special Reference to the China (Tibet) Case’ (2001) 5 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law at 482: ‘… the Panel is not a truly independent body despite 
these safeguards for independence. The Panel’s independence is primarily counterbalanced by the fact 
that it only has advisory powers.’
87 See section 3.1 above.
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traditional conceptions of public international law rather than being necessarily 
inherent to the concept of ‘international territorial administrations’ as such. In the 
WBIP project, for instance, vertical comparative analysis reveals that the Inspection 
Panel does not have any remedial capability – potentially a signifi cant difference 
between the Panel and courts exercising judicial review. On the other hand, closer 
analysis of the Panel’s practice reveals that the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors 
informally involves the Panel in remedial activities on occasion.88
 Thus, the outcome of stage three is a thorough understanding of the similarities 
and differences between national and international legal systems in relation to the 
comparative object. These insights position researchers to prove or disprove the 
hypothesis and formulate specifi c recommendations, which will be discussed in 
stage four.
3.4 Stage Four: Synthesising
At its core, stage four requires researchers to establish whether the hypothesis has 
been proven or disproven and to decide what conclusions and/or recommendations 
can be formulated based on this fi nding. Compared to stages one to three (which 
are distinctly ‘descriptive-analytical’), stage four may therefore include normative 
elements.89 Seen from this perspective, stage four of the Method is typical of the 
fi nal stage of a scientifi c research project. However, for vertical comparative law 
methods, such as the Method under discussion, stage four is the culmination of legal 
transposition, that is, the process of transferring the ideas behind legal concepts (if not, 
strictly speaking, the legal concepts themselves) from the national to the international 
level. Some refer to this process as legal ‘borrowing’ or ‘transplantation’.90 Whatever 
its designation, the term has to imply adaptation (i.e. ‘tailoring’ or ‘customisation’). 
As Wiener describes this process, if somewhat fatalistically:
… we are selecting a bit of regulatory DNA from national law, inserting it into an international law 
embryo [sic], and hoping that this new legal hybrid will grow to be a hardy offspring.91
In fact, given the lessons legal comparativists have learnt from instances of ‘mindless 
borrowing’, any mode of legal comparison is at its most effective for problem-solving 
purposes if this transformational aspect is taken seriously. As Palmer explains:
…[legal] transplants almost always undergo some modifi cation and reform not only at an unconscious 
epistemological level (wherein borrowed rules receive a distinct local interpretation or ‘translation’ 
by the local culture); there is often a conscious revision of the transplant to conform to an analogous 
or cognate legal idea already present in the system. The process is neither new nor abnormal in many 
mixed systems. It is actually a kind of creative convergence – the construction of autonomous law out 
of borrowed elements.92
It is also important to note that the existence of similarities does not necessarily lead 
to a verifi cation of the hypothesis, as this depends, for example, on the nature of 
those similarities (as qualifi ed during stage three). Likewise, differences revealed by 
the vertical analysis do not necessarily have to lead to a refutation of the hypothesis. 
In case of the WBIP project, for example, the absence of remedial capacity in the 
88 This typically involves cases surrounded by controversy or fi ndings of gross incompliance with 
Bank operational policies, such as the 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project request, the 
2001 Chad Petroleum and Pipeline Project Request and the 2007 Albania Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management and Clean-Up Project request. See: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64132057~pagePK:64130364~piPK:64132056~theSite
PK:380794,00.html> (last accessed 1 May 2009).
89 Brand, above n. 35, at 453.
90 Wiener, above n. 1 at 1298.
91 Id., at 1371.
92 Palmer, above n. 17, at 276.
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Inspection Panel process does not lead to a conclusion that there is no meaningful 
equivalence between the Panel and courts exercising judicial review. The particular 
conclusion, rather, centres on the need for the Inspection Panel process to be amended 
so as to formalise the Panel’s role in formulating and/or enforcing remedies.
 In sum, the outcomes of this fi nal stage of the Method are a proven or disproven 
hypothesis, as well as conclusions and/or recommendations based thereupon. For an 
overview of the ITA/WBIP Vertical Comparative Method, see Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: The ‘ITA/WBIP’ Ve rtical Comparative Law Method
 
4 Concluding Remarks
This article explores the potential of vertical comparative law methods, which 
transpose legal concepts (or the ideas behind them) from the national to the 
international legal level, for conceptualising the ‘international rule of law’. It 
presents two kinds of considerations (typology and risk) that need to be kept in 
mind when employing comparative law methods in general. Section 2 outlines four 
potential modes of comparison: horizontal (among national legal systems or among 
international (quasi-)legal regimes) and vertical (top-down: from international law 
to national law; or bottom-up: from national law to international law). Section 2 
also highlights three common risks associated with comparative law methodology 
(not considering the context properly, conducting a one-dimensional analysis and 
skewing the results of the comparative analysis based on preconceived ideas about 
‘law’ or due to a narrow focus on the comparative objective) and suggests ways to 
mitigate them. Section 3 sets out a particular vertical, bottom-up comparative law 
method, as employed in the context of two separate doctoral research projects that 
both analyse ways to enhance the accountability of international institutions (the ITA 
project and the WBIP project). This four-stage method (formulating a hypothesis; 
constructing a conceptual model; applying the conceptual model to the international 
level; and synthesising fi ndings) may be regarded as an example of the type of 
vertical, bottom-up comparative law method that could aid the conceptualisation of 
the ‘international rule of law’.
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 This article draws two major conclusions based on the experience of employing 
this Method in the context of the ITA and WBIP research projects.
 Firstly, employing vertical, bottom-up comparative law methods is increasingly 
justifi ed by the emergence of a ‘common zone of impact’ (i.e. a situation in which 
individuals are affected by the exercise of public power – whether by states, 
international institutions or both). Though best illustrated through the substantive 
fi ndings of the ITA and WBIP doctoral research projects, suffi ce it to state here that 
the changing nature of international law and the intensifi ed interplay between the 
national and international legal levels give rise to new legal problems that, in turn, 
call for solutions that cannot be easily found within international law – at least not in 
its current stage of evolution. Hence, this situation presents a compelling justifi cation 
– and an interesting opportunity – for considering national legal systems when 
looking for potential solutions to address the accountability problem in international 
law, since many national systems have been dealing with ways to curb the exercise 
of public power for quite some time.
 Secondly, vertical bottom-up comparative law methods indeed have the potential 
to address problems such as the accountability issue at the international level. The 
remainder of this section outlines a few considerations that might lead to a greater 
realisation of this potential.
 To start with, while there are defi nite risks involved in employing vertical, 
bottom-up comparative law methods, this article argues that the risks are not 
necessarily greater compared to other modes of legal comparison and that they can 
be suffi ciently mitigated. Moreover, national legal concepts may often seem to be 
inadequate for application outside their original (national) legal contexts, but it 
is often the existence of formal and frequently peripheral elements (such as strict 
contextual connotations or the terminology traditionally associated with those legal 
concepts) that make them seem unsuitable for the purpose of vertical, bottom-up 
legal comparison.93 By distilling the ideas behind such legal concepts,94 it becomes 
possible to make a distinction between associations that are inherent to the idea and 
others that are mostly contextual or formal characteristics that can be accounted for.
 In addition, the need for a common comparative law language and shared 
conceptual frameworks is widely acknowledged among legal comparativists.95 
However, this article argues that they are urgently required if vertical, bottom-
up legal comparative methodology is to ‘move beyond serendipitous vertical 
borrowing’ and hence realise its potential.96 As Wiener argues, international lawyers 
have ‘to engage in a systemic inventory and evaluation of the national law ideas … 
available worldwide, in both large and small countries’ – including sharing their 
‘experiences of success and failure’.97 It is especially by sharing our experiences, as 
we have attempted to do in this article, that the development of a shared language 
and conceptual tools may become a reality.
93 See e.g. N. Walker, ‘Post-National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ (2003) IILJ 
Working Paper 2003/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series), available at: <http://www.
iilj.org> (last accessed 1 May 2009). For a more linguistic perspective, see V. Grosswald Curran, 
‘Comparative Law and Language’ in Reimann and Zimmerman, above n. 22, at 675-708.
94 In terms of the Method presented in this article, by developing multi-faceted conceptual models 
describing the legal concept in question. See section 3.2 above.
95 See in general Gerber, above n. 35. See also Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 44-45, where it is 
argued that the establishment of a shared vocabulary could ‘identify the demands that a particular slice 
of life poses for the law in all systems where the social and economic conditions are similar and provide 
a realistic context within which to compare and contrast the various solutions, however much they may 
differ technically or substantially.’
96 Wiener, above n. 1, at 1366. See also Haraszti, above n. 47, at 116.
97 Wiener, above n. 1, at 1366.
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 Finally, sharing experiences may not be a simple matter either, since comparative 
law methodology often bears a treacherous simplicity. In other words, the need to 
set out a comprehensive comparative law methodology often seems superfl uous, 
discouraging legal comparativists from elaborating on methodology because, 
it is argued, ‘facts of common knowledge require no proof’.98 As a result, legal 
comparativists may remain vague or even silent on the comparative legal methodology 
they are employing.99 On the other hand, those engaged in comparative law analysis 
can easily become entangled in its complexities, not to mention its politics, which 
usually lurk just below the surface. That is to say, the comparative legal methodology 
is elaborated to the point of becoming convoluted and of little practical use, since 
it contains ‘unrealistic and unattainable standards’, even – as Palmer quips – by the 
standards of academics.100 However, we maintain that the ‘message from Mount 
Olympus must not be that comparative law is always forbidding and diffi cult. It must 
be accessible and its methods must be fl exible.’101
 Indeed, fear of stating the obvious should not prevent legal comparativists 
from sharing their experiences; and neither should it cause them to ‘dress up’ their 
methodology so that it appears more intricate than it is. As Koopmans notes, it is 
a ‘comforting thought’ to realise that there are ‘general truths’ that permeate our 
thinking.102 We may just need to be bold enough to express them.
98 Id., at 1300-1303. However, see V.V. Palmer, above n. 17 at 264, who argues that ‘even simple 
methods, which it has long been fashionable to disdain […] could all have legitimacy and value in 
practical forms of legal research’.
99 See e.g. Zweigert and Kötz, above n. 45, at 33, where the authors argue that there has been very 
little systematic writing about methods of comparative law. See also Chodosh, above n. 21, at 1044-
1046.
100 Palmer, above n. 17, at 263.
101 Id., at 290.
102 Koopmans, above n. 19, at 284.
